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Abstract. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are often deployed in hos-
tile or difficult scenarios, such as military battlefields and disaster re-
covery, where it is crucial for the network to be highly fault tolerant,
scalable and decentralized. For this reason, peer-to-peer primitives such
as Distributed Hash Table (DHT), which can greatly enhance the scala-
bility and resilience of a network, are increasingly being introduced in the
design of WSN’s. Securing the communication within the WSN is also
imperative in hostile settings. In particular, context information, such
as the network topology and the location and identity of base stations
(which collect data gathered by the sensors and are a central point of
failure) can be protected using traffic encryption and anonymous routing.
In this paper, we propose a protocol achieving a modified version of
onion routing over wireless sensor networks based on the DHT paradigm.
The protocol prevents adversaries from learning the network topology
using traffic analysis, and therefore preserves the context privacy of the
network. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is designed to minimize the
computational burden and power usage of the nodes, through a novel
partitioning scheme and route selection algorithm.
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, context privacy, anonymity, onion
routing, distributed hash table.
1 Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) generally consist of a number of small, low-
power computing sensors, deployed in an environment where they observe physi-
cal phenomena. The sensors, typically battery-powered and highly constrained in
their computational capabilities, are nonetheless able to perform sensing, wireless
communication and computation tasks. They collect and disseminate data about
the supervised phenomena cooperatively, and collaborate in order to perform a
common task. WSN’s applications include health monitoring, smart agriculture,
weather sensing, intrusion detection and industrial control [9,6]. However, in spite
of the extensive research, WSN’s still face many challenges, including security,
privacy and network robustness and scalability. Wireless sensor networks share
some of the above challenges with peer-to-peer networks: in particular, both
network designs aim at achieving a high level of scalability in a decentralized
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manner, and must be able to cope with nodes failing, entering or abandoning
the network at any time. For this reason, some of the network constructions
used in the peer-to-peer setting have been adopted in the design of WSN [10].
In particular, the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) network topology has found
application in a number of WSN designs [5].
Privacy is also an increasing concern for WSN’s [8]. The wireless nature of the
communication link makes the network inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping.
Moreover, nodes of the wireless sensor network are often deployed outdoor, in
unsurveilled areas where they can be subject to tampering. An attacker might
be able to gain control of one or more nodes. For this reason, privacy must be
preserved even against internal adversaries. In particular, both the privacy of
the data gathered and the privacy of the context should be protected. In order
to preserve data privacy, nodes should not be able to build a more detailed
picture of the data than it is required for their functioning (aggregation).With
regard to context privacy, instead, the primary aim is to hide the location of
sensors and base stations, the network topology and in certain cases the time
data was collected. WSN’s are in general highly vulnerable to attacks targeted at
base stations, which coordinate network operation and gather data: the failure
of a base station can in fact disrupt the whole network. The geographic location
of base stations and the network topology should therefore be concealed [2].
Common strategies for hiding location and prevent traffic analysis are flooding,
transmissions from fake sources [14], and random walks [7]. Random walks for the
transmission of the information, in particular, have been adopted in a number
of designs. Zhang proposed self-adjusting directed random walks in [15], while
GROW (Greedy Random Walk) [13] introduced a two-way random walk, from
both source and destination, to reduce the chance of an eavesdropper being
able to collect location information. Finally, layers of encryption can be used to
protect the information at each hop in the walk [3].
In this paper we propose a modified onion routing protocol for wireless sensor
networks that are based on the distributed hash table topology. Onion routing,
the anonymity protocol at the base of Tor and other privacy preserving technolo-
gies, can prevent tampering and preserve the secrecy of both the communication
content and the location of the sender and receiver. Applied to wireless sen-
sor networks, onion routing is an effective strategy to protect context privacy.
However, the limited capabilities of sensing nodes, and the particular network
infrastructure of a WSN make implementing onion routing a challenging task.
For this reason, we aim at minimizing any computational overhead of onion rout-
ing. In particular, the processes of route selection and key distribution are fairly
complex tasks in a WSN. Route selection is made difficult by the absence of a
complete view of the network by each node. A node, in fact, might be able to
communicate directly with only a fraction of all the nodes in the WSN, due, for
instance, to distance or wireless signal visibility. We solve this issue by proposing
a route selection algorithm based on Bloom filters, which takes into account the
limited network view without compromising the secrecy of the route. Without a
directory of all nodes, implementing the standard key distribution mechanism of
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onion routing is also impossible over a WSN. Therefore, we adopt a key distri-
bution strategy designed for the DHT paradigm, making the network resilient to
nodes failing, entering and abandoning it without disrupting the onion routing
mechanism. The proposed protocol enables, for the first time, the implementa-
tion of a full-fledged onion routing mechanism over a wireless sensor network,
overcoming the traditional limitations of the typical WSN infrastructure. This,
in turn, will allow for better protection of context privacy and the location of
nodes in the network, making WSN’s more resilient to attacks targeting base
stations or specific nodes.
2 Distributed Hash Table
Peer-to-peer networks are large distributed systems designed around three main
principles: decentralization, fault tolerance and scalability. As wireless sensor net-
works are often required to satisfy the same properties, they sometimes integrate
solutions first proposed in the peer-to-peer domain [10]. This is the case, in par-
ticular, for the family of WSN’s designed around one of the most successful
peer-to-peer designs, Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [5],used daily by millions
of users through the BitTorrent protocol.
A DHT is defined over a keyspace, defined as the output range of a hash
function. The keyspace is divided among the nodes in the network by using a
partitioning scheme. For each DHT, a function defines the distance between any
two values in the keyspace. The partitioning is achieved by assigning to each node
in the network a value in the keyspace called identifier : the peer is responsible for
the subset of values in the keyspace that have less than a predefined distance from
his identifier value. Each node in the network maintains a connection to a number
of other nodes, called neighbors. Neighbors are generally selected according to a
certain structure, known as the network topology, which, together with the hash
and distance functions, defines the specific DHT. For the purpose of this paper,
we assume any WSN built over a DHT to specify: the keyspace K; the size of
the keyspace s; the hash functions h used to map information generated by the
sensors to values in the keyspace; the function fdist determining the distance
between two values in the keyspace; and the maximum distance d for which a
node with identifier A is responsible for keys in the keyspace. We also assume
the keyspace to be two-dimensional: given a distance d, a function fdist, and
a value v in the keyspace, there are exactly two values v+ and v− for which
fdist (v
+) = fdist (v
−) = d .
3 Onion Routing
Onion routing is a mechanism allowing anonymous and privacy-preserving com-
munication in a network. First proposed in 1997 [12], onion routing has recently
seen widespread use thanks to the Tor implementation [4], which counts millions
of active users. Onion routing can prevent surveillance and traffic analysis. The
identity, location and network activity of each node is protected by concealing
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to external observers both content and routing information of the node’s traffic.
This is achieved by relaying the traffic, including information about its desti-
nation, through a virtual circuit composed of three intermediary nodes (called
relays). Each relay in the circuit only learns the preceding and following node, so
that the sender remains anonymous to all relays except the first, and the desti-
nation remains secret to all relays except the last. In order to protect the actual
content of the communication, messages are repeatedly encrypted with a public
key encryption scheme in a layered manner, using in inverse order the public
keys of all the relays in the circuit. Traffic going back to the source from the
destination is similarly encrypted and routed from the last relay to the first one.
Implementing onion routing is an effective strategy to protect communication
in wireless sensor networks, especially when deployed in hostile environments,
subject to both external and internal attacks. In particular, onion routing can
prevent traffic analysis and packet eavesdropping, and at the same time prevent
malicious nodes in the network from learning sensitive information about the
network topology, such as the identity of base stations and data aggregation
nodes. This information is generally being referred to as context data.
Each node participating in an onion routing protocol has a public and private
key pair called identity key. This key serves the main purpose of authenticating
the node and prove its identity to other nodes. The identity key pair is gener-
ated during the node startup, and is maintained for the entire life of the node.
However, in order to minimize the impact of a compromised identity key, each
node also generates at regular time intervals a second key pair: the onion key.
The public key of the current onion key pair is signed using the identity key
and then distributed to other nodes. The onion key is used during circuit cre-
ation: when establishing a circuit, each node being used as relay is challenged to
prove knowledge of its (private) onion key. The actual communication over the
circuit is encrypted using a symmetric session key, agreed on by each couple of
consecutive nodes in the circuit. The key is discarded once the communication
over the circuit stops, thus achieving forward secrecy. Onion circuits, in fact, are
designed to be used only for a limited period of time. Similarly, onion keys are
discarded and replaced after they reach the end of their intended lifetime.
4 Onion Routing over DHT Wireless Sensor Networks
Sensor nodes in a WSN are typically constrained devices: at the hardware level,
due to the limited computational capabilities and often battery-powered nature,
and at the network level, due to the restricted visibility of the network each
node possesses. In order to satisfy these constraints, we design the proposed
onion routing protocol so that each node in the wireless sensor network is able
to operate both as a source of information and as a relay. However, not all nodes
will cover both roles at the same time: for energy efficiency, we select a subset
of nodes to act as relays for a given time, and rotate to the next subset of nodes
after a predetermined amount of time. Therefore, a node will be in one of the
following states at any time: relay state, during which the sensor node performs
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both sensing tasks and relays traffic of other nodes; sensor state, during which the
node continues to sense information but does not accept traffic from other nodes
for relay purposes. In order to be able to act as a relay, each node has an identity
key pair, generated using a public key encryption scheme. The identity keys can
be either loaded onto the device before deployment (to ease the computational
burden) or created during bootstrap of the node. Additionally, when the node
enters relay state, it also generates a temporary onion key pair, which is valid
only for the current relay state. Nodes distribute the public keys of both identity
and onion pairs following the strategy described in the following. We say that a
node owns a key if it generated the key, while we say that a node is responsible
for a key if it stores the key and distributes it to other peers requesting it. Keys
are transmitted over the network by using the DHT underlying the WSN.
Identity Key Distribution The subset of nodes in the network that are responsible
for the identity key of a specific node are determined by hashing the identifier of
the node using the hash function h defined by the DHT. A node X is responsible
for the identity key iN ∈ K of the node N if:
fdist (X − h (N)) < d . (1)
This defines a subset IN of size 2d of the keyspace K. The node owning the key
distributes it to the nodes responsible for storing it. Should the value d increase
during network operation, the nodes already responsible for the key distribute it
to the new nodes in IN . Should d instead decrease, the nodes that are no longer
in IN discard the key. It is important to note here that nodes in the WSN reply
to request for keys both when in relay and sensor state.
Relay State Partitioning Since we want only a subset of the nodes in the WSN
to act as onion relays at any given time, we partition the WSN by using the
identifier value of the nodes: we consider the first n bits of the identifier value
in order to have 2n different subsets. For instance, all peers with the first n bits
of the identifier having value 0 are in the first subset.
Onion Key Distribution The temporary onion keys are generated by the nodes
when entering relay state, and are subsequently distributed to the nodes respon-
sible for storing them similarly to the identity keys. However, we design the
protocol so that the nodes that are responsible for storing an identity key will
not also be responsible for the onion key of the same node. Moreover, a node
responsible for the onion key of a node for the current relay state duration, will
not be responsible for a key of the same node for a number of following relay
states. We achieve this through the distribution mechanism described in the fol-
lowing, which follows that proposed in [11]. For each node N and its identifier
iN ∈ K, we divide the network into u = s2d partitions of size 2d, such that
one such partition is IN , as defined by (1). Nodes in each partition except IN
cyclically store the onion key for N that is valid for the current relay state. The
partitions are defined by an arbitrary function
fon : K → {all possible partitions of K of size 2d} , (2)
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that takes as input an identifier i ∈ K and outputs {O1, . . . , Ou−1} (the set of
partitions), such that O1, . . . , Ou−1 are disjoint subsets of K of equal size and
O1 ∪ . . . ∪Ou−1 = K r {IN} . (3)
For any u− 1 subsequent relay states, each partition is selected once for storing
the onion key of the node, starting from O1 and moving to the following partition
until Ou−1 is reached (the cycle starts anew after that).
Private Route Selection Each node in a WSN has a limited visibility of the net-
work, and may be able to communicate with only a subset of all the nodes. This
has an impact on two basic functionalities of the proposed network: onion circuit
creation, and reporting to the base station. In the former case, two successive
relays may not be able to communicate with one another. We solve this by in-
troducing the relay filter, an additional set of information generated by relays
in relay state, and distributed similarly to the onion public key. The relay filter
for a relay node r is the subset of the other currently available relays that are
visible from r, encoded using a Bloom filter data structure [1]. Bloom filters
allow us to keep the information secret to external observers as well as the nodes
themselves. The filter is signed by the relay using its onion private key.
In order to preserve context privacy in the WSN, and therefore the identity
and network location of the base stations, these particular nodes act similarly
to other nodes for the purpose of onion routing. However, base stations own an
additional set of keys, the station key pair. These keys are generated before the
WSN deployment, and are embedded in each node reporting to the relative base
station. Station keys are used to sign a filter similar to the relay filter, the station
filter. The station filter encodes a randomly selected subset of all the relays that
are visible from the relays the base station can connect to. Due to the property
of Bloom filters, it is possible for the base station to generate the station filter
based on the relay filters. The distribution of station filters and its impact on
privacy are discussed in Section 4.1.
The mechanism for building an onion circuit between a sensor node and a
base station is presented in Protocol 1. The proposed circuit building approach
is alternative to that presented in [13], and to Tor hidden services [4].
4.1 Privacy Analysis
According to the distributed trust principle, no single relay in the circuit should
learn the identity of both nodes at the two ends of the circuit. We achieve this
by letting the nodes select independently the first relay, and by disclosing to
each relay only the previous and following step in the circuit. This is possible
thanks to the use of the intersection filters explained in step 2 and 3 of the
circuit building protocol. Distributed trust provides protection for the context
information of the wireless sensor network. We identify two private context in-
formation that we aim to preserve: the network location (that is, the position
within the DHT) and the identity of the nodes acting as base stations. Use of
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Protocol 1: Building an Onion Circuit.
1 The sensor node S identifies the current relays through the partition function,
and acquires relay information (current keys and filters) through the DHT, by
querying the appropriate set of responsible nodes Oi. Then S selects among its
neighbors a potential first relay for the sensor’s end of the circuit.
2 S calculates the intersection filter bi = br ∩ bs between the filter of the selected
first relay br and the station filter bs. Then, S sends bi to the relay and instructs
it to build a circuit with one of its own neighbors whose identifier satisfies bi.
3 Similarly to the sensor, and concurrently, the base station node B selects among
its neighbors a potential first relay for the station’s end of the circuit. Then, it
instructs the relay to build a circuit with a neighboring second relay that
satisfies a randomly selected subset of the first relay’s filter.
4 Once second relays have been selected at both ends of the circuit, the sensor
and the base station instruct the relative second relays to look for potential
matches. The two relays start querying all neighboring relays for potential
circuits, and open a new circuit each time they find open ends.
5 Among all the resulting circuits, S selects the right circuit by querying the node
at the other end, and asking it to prove knowledge of the station private key. In
case no suitable circuit is found, the node starts again from step 1.
the proposed onion routing effectively conceals the context information to the
sensor nodes communicating with the base station, as no information other than
the station filter is required for communication. At the same time, relays used
in the circuit cannot distinguish a sensor from a base station, as the same steps
are taken by both S and B. This is true for as long as the base station does not
select as first relay a sensor node that has access to B’s station filter: considering
that B has access to the list of sensors reporting to itself, we can safely assume
this to be the case. For the same reason, station filters are distributed encrypted
using the station public key. New station filters are generated at every change of
state for the nodes. In order to preserve secrecy of the identity and position of
the base station, the station filter distribution can follow two strategies: random
walks (where the filter is passed on from node to node randomly, thus making
it harder to identify the originating node) or distribution through an onion cir-
cuit (where the relay at the end of the circuit will propagate the filter through
flooding). Finally, the identity key of a node is verified through a challenge by
the node responsible for its distribution, while the onion key is verified by the
node building the circuit. Since the node obtains the identity and onion keys
from two different set of nodes (Section 4), an adversary would need to corrupt
a majority of nodes in both sets in order to perform an attack. This would also
have to be repeated at each change of state.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an onion routing protocol for wireless sensor net-
works based on the distributed hash table paradigm. The protocol minimizes
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the introduced overhead by partitioning the network and rotating relay respon-
sibilities over time, which is particularly effective in battery-powered devices.
The proposed construction allows for limited network visibility by the nodes,
and is entirely decentralized. Context privacy is preserved by the distributed
trust of the onion mechanism, and both sensor nodes and base stations remain
anonymous within the network. The network topology is kept secret as a result,
opening the way to implementation in WSN deployed in hostile settings.
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